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I. INTRODUCTION
“When change is inevitable, you must spot it, embrace it, and find
1
ways to make it work for you.”
The face of America has changed drastically since the advent
2
of computers. More specifically, computer technology is now a
3
permanent fixture in the legal field and has become the trial
† B.A. University of Minnesota; J.D. William Mitchell College of Law.
1. Frank Herrera, Jr. & Sonia M. Rodriguez, Courtroom Technology: Tools for
Persuasion, 35 MAY-Trial 66 (1999) (quoting Bill Gates).
2. Robert B. Bennett, Jr. et al., Seeing Is Believing; Or Is It?: An Empirical Study
of Computer Simulations As Evidence, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 257 (1999). “Our
society is fascinated, even obsessed, with modern technology, particularly
computers which project an aura of objectivity.” Id. at 258. See also Mario Borelli,
Note, The Computer as Advocate: An Approach to Computer-Generated Displays in the
Courtroom, 71 IND. L.J. 439, 439 (1996) (“In the 1990’s, our culture has become
computer crazed. We constantly hear such terms as ‘information superhighway,’
the ‘net,’ and ‘multimedia.’”).
3. See Fred Galves, Where the Not-So-Wild Things Are: Computers in the Courtroom,
the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Need for Institutional Reform and More Judicial
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litigator’s most powerful weapon. In the past several years,
computer animations have developed into “a new and consistently
changing medium that challenges the traditional criteria for
5
determining prejudicial diagrams or video reenactments.” The
6
influence of computers has changed the look and feel of litigation.
Computers are now being used to present complex evidence to the
7
jury in the form of computer animations and simulations. With
the ever-increasing use of computer animations in criminal
litigation, courts should be receptive to their use and provide trial
8
courts a way to make it work. Unfortunately, in State v. Stewart, the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s first decision dealing with the use of
computerized animation, the court spotted the change and
embraced it, but failed to provide district courts with a way to
“make it work.”
This article examines the development of computerized
9
animation and its use in the legal field. It then analyzes the
10
Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding in Stewart and the
11
consequences of that ruling. Finally, the article concludes that
the court’s decision failed to delineate a test for the district courts
to apply when faced with the use of computerized animation in a

Acceptance, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 161, 166-67 (2000) (“Indeed, any perspective that
may have initially prevailed of computerization in the courtroom as a threatening
newcomer . . . is fading into the view that the incorporation of [computergenerated exhibits] in the courtroom is positive, inevitable, and in many ways
quite natural.”).
4. See Michael Hoenig, “Gatekeeping” Reliability of Computer Simulations, N.Y.
L.J., July 10, 2000, at 3 (“Computer assisted courtroom animation has become a
powerful tool for the visual recreation of accidents, mechanical failures and other
occurrences.”).
5. Cope C. Thomas, Computer Generated Animation: Identifying New and Subtle
Prejudicial Special Effects, 74 FLA. B.J. 52, 52 (2000). See also Amanda Vogt, Jury’s Out
on Animations in Court; Some Lawyers Fear Technology Creates Prejudice, CHI. TRIB., May
9, 2002, available at 2002 WL 2652962 (“In criminal courtrooms nationwide, juries
increasingly are being asked to watch 3-D computer animation, from chilling reenactments of accidents like the one that killed Chicago Fire Lt. Scott Gillen two
years ago to representations of the trajectories of bullets as they penetrate a
body.”).
6. Thomas, supra note 5, at 52.
7. See Fred H. Cate & Newton N. Minow, Communicating with Juries, 68 IND.
L.J. 1101, 1112 (1993) (illustrating how “[i]nnovative communications
technologies [such as computers] may enhance the understanding of juries . . .”).
8. 643 N.W.2d 281 (Minn. 2002).
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part IV.
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12

criminal case.

II. THE BIRTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF COMPUTER ANIMATION
A. What Is Computer Animation?
It is important to distinguish between a computer animation
and a computer simulation in order to determine the admissibility
of the piece. This determination can be difficult because there is
no bright-line distinction between the two.
In a computer simulation, data is entered into a computer for
13
analysis. The computer then draws a conclusion regarding the
14
data. Computer simulations are treated like other scientific tests;
they require proof of the validity of the scientific principles used
due to the fact that the results are dependent upon the application
15
of scientific principles. Computer animations, on the other hand,
“re-create an event, scene, or process, or simply an illustration of a
16
general principle.” In addition, computer animations are broken
down into two types: a series of still photographs linked together to
form an animation, or a simulation created from the input of raw
data that is then manipulated by a series of mathematical models to
17
simulate an occurrence. Computer animations are treated by
courts as demonstrative evidence to be used to illustrate a witness’s
testimony because the conclusions drawn from an animation are
not dependent upon the proper application of scientific
18
principles.
In summary, the basic distinction between a computer
animation and a computer simulation is that when using a
12. See infra Part V.
13. Monica M. Marquez, Admissibility of Computer-Generated Animations as
Demonstrative Evidence, 31 COLO. LAW. 89, 89 (2002).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Theresa A. Webster, The Creative Side of Law: Techniques and Advice for
Creating Effective Trial Graphics, 80 M ICH. B.J. 38, 44 (2001). See also Michael P.
Kenny & William H. Jordan, Trial Presentation Technology: A Practical Perspective, 67
TENN. L. REV. 587, 592-93 (2000) (stating “[j]ust a few years ago, computer
animation was relatively crude, using stick figures or jerky motion. Today’s highspeed computer processors and graphic rendering programs create nearly lifelike
images. Graphic artists can even insert a light source so that the computer
generates natural-looking shadows and contours.”).
18. Alyssa Litman, Brave New World? Scranton Judge’s Ruling Widens Door for
Commonplace Use of Visual Technology, 25 PA. L. WKLY. 725, 725 (2002).
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computer animation the focus is on illustration, while computer
19
simulations focus on computation of raw data and illustration.
B. The History of Computer Animation
The legal profession was barely even aware of the concept of
20
computer animation ten years ago. It was not until approximately
five years ago that computer animation began to emerge in the
fields of product liability and medical malpractice, and even then it
was used only by a handful of attorneys in high-priced civil
21
lawsuits.
Computerized animations have not been used in
22
criminal trials until recently.
The recent increase in the use of computer animation has
23
spurred a great debate in the legal profession. Courts have taken
differing views when looking at whether to include computers and
24
computer technology in trials. Computer-generated exhibits are
25
currently being used in a very wide variety of cases.
19. Bennett, supra note 2, at 260.
20. Litman, supra note 18, at 725.
21. Id. See also Vogt, supra note 5, at *2 (stating “[c]omputer animation has
long been used in high-stakes civil cases, but it has been slower to catch on in
criminal cases, in part because it is expensive, courtroom observers said. As the
cost decreases and computer technology advances, however, it is expected to be
used more often.”).
22. Litman, supra note 18, at 725.
23. See Galves, supra note 3, at 165-66 (quoting Timothy W. Cerniglia,
Computer Generated Exhibits—Demonstrative, Substantive or Pedagogical— Their Place in
Evidence, 18 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 1, 1 (1994)); Borelli, supra note 2, at 440 (“There
are many ways of thinking about how to deal with computers in the courtroom,
and no clear standards have been set.”).
24. Compare Star v. Campos, 655 P.2d 794, 797 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (“[T]he
court may take judicial notice of the ability of a properly programmed computer
to perform mathematical computation and of the general acceptance of the
underlying principle of the method.”) and People v. McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d 721,
722-23 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1984) (“A computer is not a gimmick and the court
should not be shy about its use, when proper. Computers are simply mechanical
tools—receiving information and acting on instructions at lightning speed. When
the results are useful, they should be accepted, when confusing, they should be
rejected.”), with Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 121 (2d Cir.
1976) (van Graafeiland, J., dissenting) (“I am not prepared to accept the product
of a computer as the equivalent of Holy Writ.”) and Exxon Corp. v. Halcon
Shipping Co., No. CIV.A.91-920, 1995 WL 20667, at *23 (D. N.J. Jan. 18, 1995)
(“This [computer simulation] is the type of exhibit that Daubert v. Merrill Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), had in mind when it designated the
judge as the gatekeeper to eliminate junk science from the judicial arena.”).
25. See Robinson v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 16 F.3d 1083, 1087 (10th Cir. 1994)
(upholding admission of accident simulation that illustrated expert’s theory);
Seattle Master Builders Ass’n v. Pac. Northwest Elec. Power & Conservation
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C. Debate Over Use of Computer Animation
1. Evidentiary Issues
Computers and computer animation have had a marked
26
influence on the way lawyers approach litigation. Courts presently
face new evidentiary issues regarding the admissibility of this
27
powerful illustrative tool. Computer animation provides attorneys
with a powerful evidentiary tool that has profoundly impacted the
28
29
litigation of both civil and criminal trials.
Planning Council, 786 F.2d 1359, 1370 (9th Cir. 1986) (allowing the use of
computer simulations to ascertain energy conservation value); Perma, 542 F.2d at
115 (allowing computer simulation results to form the basis of expert testimony
that pertained to the likelihood of perfection of an automobile anti-skid device);
Livingston v. Isuzu Motors, Ltd., 910 F. Supp. 1473, 1495 (D. Mont. 1995)
(holding that computer expert’s Advanced Dynamic Vehicle Simulation (ADVS)
was properly admissible as scientific evidence); Cleveland v. Bryant, 512 S.E.2d
360, 362 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding admission of computer-generated
accident reconstruction); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Boston Edison Co., 591
N.E.2d 165, 168 (Mass. 1992) (upholding the admission of a computer-generated
model that estimated energy consumption); Kudlacek v. Fiat S.P.A., 509 N.W.2d
603, 617 (Neb. 1994) (upholding the admission of expert testimony regarding the
path of a car on a road depicted by a computer simulation); McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d
at 722-23 (upholding admission of computer simulation of car crash in a seconddegree manslaughter prosecution); State v. Clark, 655 N.E.2d 795, 814 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1995), aff’d, 662 N.E.2d 362 (Ohio 1996) (upholding admission of expert’s
testimony detailing a crime scene reconstruction created through the use of
AutoCAD software); Deffinbaugh v. Ohio Tpk. Comm’n, 588 N.E.2d 189, 194
(Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (upholding the admission of two computer-generated
simulations at trial); Karen D. Butera, Seeing Is Believing: A Practitioner’s Guide to the
Admissibility of Demonstrative Computer Evidence, 46 CLEV . ST. L. REV. 511, 518-19
nn.75-84 (1998) (noting a variety of civil and criminal cases in which computergenerated exhibits have been used); Kristin L. Fulcher, Comment, The Jury as
Witness: Forensic Computer Animation Transports Jurors to the Scene of a Crime or
Automobile Accident, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 55, 62 (1996) (“One popular use of
computer-generated evidence is to reconstruct automobile accidents.”).
26. See Borelli, supra note 2, at 439 (discussing the growing role of computer
animation in trials).
27. See generally I. Neel Chatterjee, Admitting Computer Animations: More Caution
and New Approach Are Needed, 62 DEF. COUNS. J. 36 (1995) (arguing computer
animation evidence should be admitted under the same standards governing
computer-simulated evidence); Vicki S. Menard, Comment, Admission of Computer
Generated Visual Evidence: Should There Be Clear Standards?, 6 SOFTWARE L.J. 325
(1993) (discussing standards for admitting computer-generated evidence).
28. See S. Michael Kozubek, The Visual Courtroom: A Picture Is Worth More than a
Thousand Words, LAW. PC, Feb. 15, 1994, at 1, 2 (discussing the use of computer
animation in multimillion-dollar product liability cases).
29. See Edward J. Bardelli, The Use of Computer Simulations in Criminal
Prosecutions, 40 WAYNE L. REV. 1357, 1357 (1994).
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To get computer animation admitted into evidence, attorneys
must first lay a proper foundation pursuant to Rule 901 of the
30
Federal Rules of Evidence. Conclusive evidence regarding the
31
exhibit’s authenticity is not required. The only thing the offering
party is required to offer is proof sufficient “to allow the issue of
32
authenticity to reach the jury.” In order for the evidence to reach
the jury, however, a judge must determine the admissibility of the
33
animation. The initial admissibility determination for computergenerated evidence remains with the trial judge using a
34
preponderance of the evidence standard.
Authentication of
35
computer-generated animation is addressed in Rule 901(b)(9).
Rule 901(b)(9) requires the offering party to present a description
of the “process or system used to produce a result” and establish
36
that it “produces an accurate result.” A qualified expert is often
required to testify as to the animation’s reliability and accuracy
30. Carlo D’Angelo, The Snoop Doggy Dogg Trial: A Look at How Computer
Animation Will Impact Litigation in the Next Century, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 561, 567
(1998).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 567-68. The initial determination of admissibility hinges upon the
judge’s determination under Rule 104(b) that an adequate foundation has been
laid for admitting the exhibit. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 9.2 (1995). This determination by the judge, however, is
only limited to a finding of “whether there is evidence sufficient to support a jury
finding of authenticity.” Id. If this threshold requirement is satisfied, then the
exhibit is typically admitted—unless there exist other grounds for exclusion. Id.
Once the moving party admits an exhibit into evidence, however, the opposing
party may offer “counter proof” that challenges its authenticity. Id. It is important
to bear in mind that once an exhibit is admitted under Rule 901, the ultimate
decision of whether to accept it as authentic rests entirely within the jury’s
discretion. Id.
34. See FED . R. EVID. 104. See also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 589-92 (1993) (outlining nature and scope of trial judge’s screening
duty); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76 (1987) (stating that the trial
court must find evidence “more likely than not” meets policy and technical issues
addressed by Federal Rules of Evidence).
35. FED . R. EVID. 901(b)(9).
36. Id. The requirements of Rule 901(b)(9) can generally be met by offering
evidence that:
“(1) the computer equipment is accepted in the field as standard and
competent and was in good working order, (2) qualified computer
operators were employed, (3) proper procedures were followed in
connection with the input and output of information, (4) a reliable
software program was utilized, (5) the equipment was programmed and
operated correctly, and (6) the exhibit is properly identified as the
output in question.”
M UELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 33, at § 9.17.
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37

when dealing with computer animations.
A court may also
require prompt pretrial disclosure due to the sophisticated nature
of the computer animation to assure that opposing counsel has
been provided with enough time to evaluate and rebut the exhibit’s
38
authenticity.
Once authenticity of the exhibit has been established, the
39
focus shifts to the relevancy of the animation. This is a crucial
step in the process because if the animation is found to be
irrelevant, the evidence is inadmissible—even as a demonstrative
40
aid. To be deemed relevant, the offering party must establish that
the exhibit “has a tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
41
less probable than it would be without the evidence.” The
attorney need only establish that the evidence has some probative
value and is not required to establish that the animation will prove
42
a fact at issue in the case. All the attorney needs to show to prove
probative value is a “relation between an item of evidence and a
43
matter properly provable in the case.”
2. Impact of Computer Animation on Jury Perception
“Even if the proffered evidence is deemed relevant, it might
44
nevertheless be excluded on grounds of prejudice.” A judge may
exclude a computer-animated exhibit if the opposing party can
establish that the evidence, if admitted, could be used by the jury
45
causing an “improper” or “unusually irrational” decision. It may
also be excluded if it is likely that it could mislead the jury or cause

37. See David Muir, Computer Animation: Debunking the Myths, M ASS. LAW.
WKLY., Mar. 23, 1992, at S1, available in WESTLAW, MLW.
38. D’Angelo, supra note 30, at 568.
39. Id. (citing FED . R. EVID. 402).
40. Id. (citing FED . R. EVID. 402).
41. Id. (quoting M UELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 33, at § 4.1).
42. Id.
43. Id. (quoting M UELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 33, at § 4.1).
44. Id. (citing FED . R. EVID. 403). “Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” FED .
R. EVID. 403.
45. D’Angelo, supra note 30, at 569-70. (citing GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 403.1) “Consequently, if the evidence arouses the jury’s emotional
sympathies, evokes a sense of horror, or appeals to an instinct to punish, the
evidence may be unfairly prejudicial.” Id.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003

7

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 19
G ODDEN-CARTOON CRIMINALS2 FORMATTED . DOC

362

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

9/15/2003 6:23 PM

[Vol. 30:1

46

them to confuse the issues. A judge presiding over the matter can
exclude a relevant piece of evidence if it “would require the trier of
fact to engage in intricate, extraordinary or impossible mental
gymnastics in order to comprehend the import of the evidence or
47
to assess its weight.” Finally, computer-animated exhibits may be
excluded in situations where a jury could “ascribe excessive,
48
unwarranted weight” to the evidence. For a judge to exclude the
evidence, the opposing party must prove that the danger of jury
confusion substantially outweighs the probative value of the
49
evidence. Evidence is unlikely to be excluded on a mere assertion
of possible confusion if it is both authentic and relevant to the case
50
at hand.
One of the most hotly debated issues regarding computer
animation is the impression left upon a juror’s mind once
computer technology is used, either for the presentation of
51
evidence or as actual evidence in visual format. The perceived
power of animations and simulations to sway jurors has made their
52
admissibility extremely controversial among both courts and
53
commentators.
Those who oppose the use of computer
46. Id. at 570 (citing GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 403.4).
47. Id. (citing GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 403.4).
48. Id. (quoting GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 403.4).
49. Id. (citing GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 403.4).
50. Id. (citing GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 403.4).
51. See Butera, supra note 25, at 512 (quoting Adam T. Berkoff, Computer
Simulations in Litigation: Are Television Generation Jurors Being Misled?, 77 M ARQ. L.
REV. 829, 829 (1994)); Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic
Evidence and the Power of Analogy, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 2 (1998) (stating that
“[s]eeing a photograph almost functions as a substitute for seeing the real
thing.”).
52. See, e.g., Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 121-26 (2d
Cir. 1976) (van Graafeiland, J., dissenting); Racz v. R.T. Merryman Trucking, Inc.,
No. CIV.A.92-3404, 1994 WL 124857, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 1994); Bledsoe v. Salt
River Valley Water Users’ Ass’n, 880 P.2d 689, 691-93 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); Pino v.
Gauthier, 633 So. 2d 638, 652 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Comm. Union Ins. Co. v.
Boston Edison, 591 N.E.2d 165, 167-69 (Mass. 1992); Richardson v. State Highway
& Transp. Comm’n, 863 S.W.2d 876, 881-82 (Mo. 1993) (en banc); Bray v. Bi-State
Dev. Corp., 949 S.W.2d 93, 97-100 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Kudlacek v. FIAT S.P.A.,
509 N.W.2d 603, 617-18 (Neb. 1994); Deffinbaugh v. Ohio Tpk. Comm’n, 588
N.E.2d 189, 193-94 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990); Brown v. Boise-Cascade Corp., 946 P.2d
324, 342 (Or. Ct. App. 1997); Steinhart v. St. Paul Fire & Cas. Ins., No. 96-2656,
1997 WL 697788, at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 11, 1997) (per curiam) (unpublished
table decision).
53. See, e.g., Berkoff, supra note 51, at 845-54 (1994) (suggesting the possible
abuses, misunderstandings, and disadvantages to using computer simulations);
Richard C. Jennings, Evidence Survey, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 703, 715 (1995) (stating

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss1/19

8

Godden: Cartoon Criminals: The Unclear Future of Computer Animation in th
G ODDEN-CARTOON CRIMINALS2 FORMATTED . DOC

2003]

9/15/2003 6:23 PM

COMPUTER ANIMATION IN THE COURTROOM

363

animation argue that a jury will be left with the impression that the
54
animation is one of truth. Critics of video evidence being used in
the courtroom have voiced many of the same concerns that are
now being raised by those who opposed the use of computer55
animated evidence. Despite the fact that computer animation
provides an extremely effective communication tool that can be
used to help jurors deal with boring or cumbersome testimony,
lawyers need to realize that it requires the use of subtle techniques
56
that can be unfamiliar to many in the legal profession. Lawyers
need to examine the creative and sometimes subtle features to
57
determine if the animation has a prejudicial effect.
III. THE STEWART DECISION
A. Facts
1. The Shooting
On April 26, 2000, at approximately 9:30 p.m., seventeen-year
old Anthony Basta (“Basta”) told his mother that he was going on a
“[v]ideo animation may have a dramatic power over the trier of fact …”); Declan
O’Flaherty, Computer-Generated Displays in the Courtroom: For Better or Worse?, 4 WEB J.
CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 1, § 3 (Sept. 30, 1996) available at http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/
1996/issue4/oflah4.html/oflah4.html (last visited July 22, 2003).
54. Elan E. Weinrab, “Counselor, Proceed With Caution”: The Use of Integrated
Evidence Presentation Systems and Computer-Generated Evidence in the Courtroom, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 393, 395 (2001); see also James E. Carbine & Lynn McLain,
Proposed Model Rules Governing the Admissibility of Computer-Generated Evidence, 15
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 5 (1999) (arguing that individuals
“more easily give credibility to televised information. If Peter Jennings says it
happened, it happened.”). But see James W. McElhaney, Gizmos in the Courtroom, 83
A.B.A. J. 74, 75 (1997) (quoting attorney David Malone: “Just because it’s on a
television screen doesn’t mean the jury thinks it happened that way.”); Andrew C.
Wilson et al., Tracking Spills and Releases: High-Tech in the Courtroom, 10 TUL. ENVTL.
L.J. 371, 371-72 (1997) (“Constant exposure to movie and television animation has
led the public and jurors to suspect ‘computer magic’ in any extraordinary visual
sequence.”).
55. D’Angelo, supra note 30, at 585 n.221 (citing Karen Martin Campbell, Roll
Tape—Admissibility of Videotape Evidence in the Courtroom, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 1445,
1464 (1996); Edward V. Filardi & Dimitrios T. Drivas, The Presentation of
Demonstrative and Visual Evidence at Trial, in PATENT LITIGATION 1990, at 245, 254
(PLI PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES No. 299, 1990), available in WESTLAW, PLI-PAT).
56. Thomas, supra note 5, at 54.
57. Id.
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58

bicycle ride. At about 10:00 p.m., Charles Joy (“Joy”) was riding
his bicycle in the northbound lane on Mississippi River Boulevard
59
in St. Paul. He noticed an individual, later identified as Basta,
60
riding his bicycle southbound in the bike lane. Joy observed a car
approaching Basta from behind. The car pulled up next to Basta,
61
and Joy heard a “popping” sound and also heard Basta say “ow.”
He then saw Basta ride forward on his bicycle for another ten feet
62
and then fall off the bicycle. Paramedics arrived on the scene at
63
10:12 p.m. Basta died fourteen minutes later at St. Paul Regions
64
Hospital.
2. The Investigation
Investigators found no physical evidence of the shooting, and
65
the only witness was Joy. On May 3, they received information
that Victoria Ernst was at a party and heard someone, later
66
identified as Dale Stewart, admit to the shooting. According to
Ernst, Stewart said that he and some friends were driving around,
saw a “kid” riding a bike, and thought it would be funny to scare
67
the kid. Ernst claimed that Stewart also thought it was funny that
he later returned to the scene of the shooting and signed some
68
kind of crime prevention statement.
She told investigators
Stewart said that when he and his two companions left the scene of
69
the shooting, they had planned to try killing someone else.
After locating Stewart, the police conducted three tape70
recorded interviews of him. In the first interview, Stewart denied

58. Stewart, 643 N.W.2d at 283.
59. Id. at 283-84.
60. Id. at 284.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. Stewart told the investigator that he only wanted to scare the kid but
not kill him. Id.
68. Id. Citizens created a memorial where Basta was shot and distributed a
petition addressed to St. Paul Mayor Norm Coleman, asking him to direct the
Department of Public Works to keep the memorial. Id. at n.1. The petition also
reminded citizens to stop the violence. Id.
69. Id. at 284.
70. Id. The first two interviews took place at the St. Paul Police Department
Homicide Unit office. Id. Stewart was not under arrest at that time. Id. at 285.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss1/19

10

Godden: Cartoon Criminals: The Unclear Future of Computer Animation in th
G ODDEN-CARTOON CRIMINALS2 FORMATTED . DOC

2003]

9/15/2003 6:23 PM

COMPUTER ANIMATION IN THE COURTROOM

365

71

any involvement in the shooting. When investigators learned that
a gun had been seen at Stewart’s apartment in Bloomington before
72
the shooting, they initiated a second interview. During the
second interview, the investigator questioned Stewart about the gun
and suggested several possible scenarios of how the shooting
73
occurred. According to the investigator, Stewart eventually cried
and admitted that he, Daniel Angus, and Jonathan McNeill were
driving along Mississippi River Boulevard on the night of the
74
shooting. Stewart said that he was in the front passenger seat,
75
Angus was in the back seat, and McNeill was driving. Stewart told
the investigator that one of the other two told him that there was a
76
gun under the seat. Stewart picked up the gun and then, being
“stupid and careless,” stuck the gun out the window and pulled the
77
trigger. Stewart told the investigator where to find the shell casing
78
that he had kept because it jammed in the gun. Stewart was then
79
placed under arrest.
After his arrest, investigators conducted a third interview with
80
Stewart. During that interview, Stewart informed the investigators
81
that the gun belonged to Angus. He also said that in the weeks
leading up to the shooting, the three of them had discussed using
the gun to rob people; in the days preceding the shooting, they
82
actually went up to Mississippi River Boulevard with a loaded gun.
Stewart said that they all agreed when McNeill suggested that they
83
kill their targets rather than just rob them. Stewart told the
investigator that he gave Angus and McNeill the impression that he
was a willing participant in the scheme, but that he had no

71. Id. at 284. Stewart said he was on probation, he was not the type of person
who would do such a crime, and that he could never kill anybody. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 284-85.
74. Id. at 285.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. He stated that he did not see Basta as he pulled the trigger. Id.
78. Id. Investigators later recovered shell casings from Stewart’s residence
and a 9-mm semiautomatic handgun from McNeill’s apartment. Id. Ballistics tests
confirmed that Basta had been shot with this gun. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. While they had picked out individuals as targets, they did not follow
through with their plan to rob them. Id.
83. Id.
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84

intention to rob or kill anyone. He claimed that he went along
only because he feared that his friends would reject him if did not
85
go along with the plan.
Stewart then told the investigator about the events leading up
86
to the shooting and the shooting itself. Stewart stated that the
three of them drove up to Mississippi River Boulevard with the
87
purpose of killing someone, just to see if they could do it.
Someone then spotted Basta and they turned the car around to
88
follow him. As they came upon Basta, Stewart stuck his hand and
89
the gun out the window and pulled the trigger. He said that they
then headed to Roseville because Angus wanted to shoot
90
someone.
B. Court Proceedings
1. Pretrial
On June 14, 2000, Stewart was indicted for first-degree
91
murder. At a preliminary hearing on August 4, 2000, the state
provided notice that one of the exhibits it would seek to present at
the trial was a computerized animation prepared by Dan Davis, an
92
assistant Hennepin County medical examiner. The animation was
intended to aid the testimony of Susan Roe, an assistant medical
examiner for Ramsey and Washington counties, regarding Basta’s
93
internal injuries.
A motion in limine was filed by Stewart’s
94
attorney regarding the computer animation and Spreigl evidence
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. Stewart claimed that McNeill and Angus intended to kill Basta, but
that his objective was only just to scare him. Id.
90. Id. The three stopped to meet Angus’ girlfriend; later they returned to
the scene of the shooting but left because the street was blocked off by police. Id.
91. Id. at 286.
92. Id.
93. Id. The state alleged that the animation would help the medical
examiner explain the autopsy findings because the bullet path was not readily
understandable due to the fact that the shot came from a moving vehicle and
Basta was on a moving bicycle when he was shot. Id.
94. Other-crimes evidence is often referred to as “Spreigl evidence” in
Minnesota after the court’s decision in State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d
167 (1965). Id. at 286 n.2. In Stewart, the state sought to introduce evidence that
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95

that the state was also seeking to introduce.
The animation was presented to the judge by use of Microsoft
96
PowerPoint and consisted of four sequences. The first sequence
97
showed Basta facing the viewer, bicycling on the side of the road.
The car moved up from behind Basta, and as it approached him,
the front seat passenger, who was holding a gun, placed his arm
98
outside the car. The passenger rested his arm with the gun
99
pointed at the ground until the car was alongside Basta. When the
passenger turned to look at Basta, he extended his arm toward
100
Basta, and fired the gun. The bullet’s path was indicated in the
animation by a red beam from the gun to where the bullet struck
101
Basta. The remaining three sequences contained the same events
as the first with the only difference being the vantage point of the
102
viewer.
At a pretrial hearing, “the state requested that the court rule
103
quickly on the admissibility of the animation.” Stewart “opposed
the admissibility of the animation on the grounds that (1) the
medical examiner could explain the shooting without the
animation and (2) there was no adequate foundation for the
104
animation.” He further argued that because no testimony had
been taken in the case, no foundation had been laid for the “state’s
argument that the animation constituted an objective re-creation of
105
the shooting.”
The state responded to this argument by
explaining that foundation for the animation would be laid
106
throughout the trial. The prosecutor argued that “the animation
Stewart and Angus had both previously participated in a burglary and conspiracy
to commit first-degree murder. Stewart, 643 N.W.2d at 286.
95. Stewart, 643 N.W.2d at 286.
96. Id.
“The animation originally contained five sequences depicting
different views of the shooting.” Id. at 286 n.4. While all five were admitted for
demonstrative purposes, only four were shown during Roe’s testimony. The fifth
was never used. Id.
97. Id. at 286.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. The second sequence showed the back of Basta as he bicycled down
the road with the car approaching Basta from behind; the third sequence
provided a view of the passenger side of the car; the fourth and final sequence
showed a frontal view of the car. Id.
103. Id. at 287.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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is simply an indication upon time-honored courtroom practices of
allowing courtroom demonstrations to show three dimensional
things,” and “[t]his graphic is simply an animation that places a
little bit more information in the same view to the jury to
appreciate the point of fire and the direction of fire and how it
107
impacted the victim’s body.”
The judge then questioned the prosecutor regarding the
108
foundation for the animation.
The prosecutor informed the
court that during the trial he could augment the record to show
that the animation was consistent with the car’s size, the width of
109
the road, and the bike path. Stewart argued that some of the
scenes from the animation, such as the scene depicting events
within the car, “would have no basis at all to show the entry wound
110
and the angle and all of that.” At that point, the judge decided
that during the trial he would allow the medical examiner to testify
outside the hearing of the jury in order to make a determination of
whether the animation was accurate and would be helpful to her
111
testimony.
Following the pretrial hearing, Stewart’s attorney submitted a
112
motion to preclude the computerized animation. In the motion,
113
Stewart relied on State v. Hopperstad in support of his argument
114
that the computerized animation was not relevant evidence. In
Hopperstad, the court of appeals found that a re-creation of the
115
incident that led to the defendant’s arrest was not relevant.
Stewart argued that based on the fact that the animation was a recreation of the shooting and that it did not tend to prove or
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. He also told the court “that he expected the medical examiner to
testify that the animation is a consistent reenactment” of where the gun was
positioned at the time Basta was shot. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 367 N.W.2d 546 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). Relevant evidence is evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without
the evidence. See FED . R. EVID. 402.
114. Stewart, 643 N.W.2d at 288.
115. Id. Stewart distinguished State v. Rasinski, 464 N.W.2d 517 (Minn. Ct. App.
1990) (upholding the use of a videotaped reenactment of an automobile accident
because it tended to show how the disputed accident occurred) by arguing that
there is no dispute that Basta was shot while riding his bicycle. Stewart, 643 N.W.2d
at 288.
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disprove a fact of consequence, the court should exclude the
116
evidence.
Stewart further asserted that the animation was an
improper aid for the medical examiner because the re-creation was
“well-beyond” what the state needed in order to show the angle of
117
entry. Finally, Stewart argued that even if the court determined
that the animation was relevant, it should be excluded as
118
cumulative and prejudicial.
2. Trial
During trial, the investigator who interviewed Stewart testified
119
about what Stewart told him during the three interviews. McNeill
also testified for the prosecution regarding the events of that
evening under an agreement allowing him to plead guilty to
120
McNeill testified that he, Angus, and
second-degree murder.
Stewart were traveling northbound on Mississippi River Boulevard
on the evening of the shooting and that when they spotted Basta,
121
Angus and Stewart said, “Let’s get him.” McNeill testified that
when Angus and Stewart asked him to pull over, he turned the car
122
around to follow Basta. He then asked Stewart and Angus if they
were really going to do it, to which they both answered yes and that
123
they were excited.
McNeill testified that, as they closed in on
Basta, Stewart cocked the gun and “rested his arm out the window
124
lazily.” He testified that the gun was pointed toward the ground
125
and the window was open. As the car approached Basta, Stewart
126
leaned out the window, extended his arm, and fired the gun.
A hearing outside the presence of the jury was held before the
116. Stewart, 643 N.W.2d at 288.
117. Id.
118. Id. The court in Hopperstad found that the re-creation was cumulative
because it graphically restated the testimony of certain witnesses for the state; the
court also held that the re-creation was prejudicial because seeing the events
depicted exactly the way the state’s witnesses said they had happened was bound to
affect the jury out of proportion to its value as evidence. Hopperstad, 367 N.W.2d at
549.
119. Stewart, 643 N.W.2d at 288. Tapes of these interviews were played for the
jurors. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. After McNeill testified, two other witnesses testified regarding
discussions they had with Stewart concerning the shooting. Id. at 289.
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close of the state’s case to address the issues of “the admissibility of
the computerized animation and the admissibility of the Spreigl
evidence.”127 The court heard testimony from Dr. Roe to establish
128
the appropriate foundation for the admissibility of the animation.
Dr. Roe testified that it was common for a medical examiner to
document the distance of the firearm from the body of the victim
at the time of the shooting (the point of fire), the trajectory of the
bullet before it hit the body, where the bullet entered the body,
129
and the track of the wound in the body. Roe testified on crossexamination that the five sequences did not show the bullet
130
entering Basta’s body. When the court asked Roe whether the
animation would assist her testimony to the jury, she responded
131
that it would.
She further testified that using computerized
132
animation was becoming state of the art. The court admitted the
133
animation.
“[B]efore closing arguments, the court instructed the jurors
that the animation was not evidence in the trial or proof of any fact
and that they should disregard the animation if it did not correctly
134
reflect the testimony or other evidence in the case.” The jury
found Stewart guilty of first-degree premeditated murder, firstdegree felony murder (drive-by shooting), and second-degree
135
felony murder.
3. Supreme Court Analysis
The Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged that the trial
court admitted the computer animation “for illustrative purposes to
136
aid the medical examiner in her testimony.”
Rulings on the
admission of evidence rest with the trial court’s discretion;
therefore, sufficient evidence must be presented to demonstrate
127. Id.
128. Id. at 290. The state offered the animation “as an illustrative or
demonstrative exhibit in the course of Dr. Roe’s direct testimony.” Id.
129. Id. She testified that in making these determinations for this case, she
used information collected by investigators as well as her own autopsy findings. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. She testified that the animation would make it “somewhat easier” to
explain to a jury and was “very effective.” Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 292. The jurors were not permitted to take the animation into the
jury room during deliberations. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 292.
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that the admission was both erroneous and prejudicial.
On
appeal, Stewart argued that the computer animation was
138
substantive evidence and that insufficient foundation had been
139
laid for its admission into evidence. The court recognized that
140
demonstrative evidence “is ‘admitted, when properly verified, to
illustrate or express the testimony of a competent witness, but [is]
141
not original evidence.’” The court rejected Stewart’s argument
that the evidence was substantive, holding that the animation was
admitted and used for illustrative purposes and, therefore, it was
142
considered demonstrative evidence. The court then looked at
143
whether the admission was erroneous and prejudicial.
The court recognized that admissibility of computer-generated
animation used to assist a witness testifying in a criminal case was a
144
question of first impression in Minnesota. The court determined
that the same standard used for the admissibility of demonstrative
145
evidence and visual aids
is applicable to computerized
146
animations. Demonstrative evidence must accurately represent
147
the evidence in the record that it depicts.
The court has
previously held that visual aids such as photographs, when accurate
and relevant to a material issue, are admissible to aid a verbal
148
description of an object or condition. Because the cause of
137. See State v. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn. 1998) (holding
“[a]bsent a clear abuse of discretion, evidentiary rulings generally rest within the
trial court’s discretion”) (citing State v. Glaze, 452 N.W.2d 655, 660 (Minn. 1990));
State v. Rhodes, 627 N.W.2d 74, 84 (Minn. 2001) (holding “[a] defendant
claiming the district court erred in admitting evidence bears the burden of
proving the admission was erroneous and prejudicial”) (citing State v. Greenleaf,
591 N.W.2d 488, 504 (Minn. 1999)).
138. “Substantive evidence” is defined as “evidence that is offered to support a
fact in issue.” BLACK’ S LAW DICTIONARY 580 (7th ed. 1999).
139. Stewart, 643 N.W.2d at 292-93.
140. “Demonstrative evidence” is defined as “evidence that is offered to clarify
a statement.” BLACK’ S, supra note 138, at 577.
141. State v. Bauer, 598 N.W.2d 352, 362 (Minn. 1999) (quoting Strasser v.
Stabeck, 112 Minn. 90, 92, 127 N.W. 384, 385 (1910)).
142. Stewart, 643 N.W.2d at 293.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. The standard for demonstrative evidence and visual aids is whether the
evidence is relevant and accurate and assists the jury in understanding the
testimony of a witness. State v. DeZeler, 230 Minn. 39, 46-47, 41 N.W.2d 313, 31819 (1950).
146. Stewart, 643 N.W.2d at 293.
147. DeZeler, 230 Minn. at 46-47, 41 N.W.2d at 318-19.
148. State v. Walen, 563 N.W.2d 742, 748 (Minn. 1997) (citing State v. Martin,
261 N.W.2d 341, 344 (Minn. 1977)).
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Basta’s death was a material issue in the case, the court found that
the medical examiner’s testimony regarding the bullet’s path
through his body and the trajectory of the bullet was relevant to
149
understanding the cause of Basta’s death.
Therefore, the
animation, while not original evidence, was relevant to the extent
that it was an accurate expression or illustration that would assist
150
the jury in understanding the medical examiner’s testimony. In
order to determine whether the evidence was relevant, the court
151
next examined the subject matter of the animation.
The court believed that the first, second, and fourth sequences
were helpful, as they clearly depicted both a shot being fired from a
152
moving vehicle and the bullet path from the car to the victim.
However, the problem with the animation, in the opinion of the
153
court, rested with the depiction of the events inside the car. The
court held that the facial expressions and movements of the
individuals depicted within the car prior to firing the gun did not
154
express or illustrate the medical examiner’s testimony, and that
the animation contained material that was based on a “great deal of
155
conjecture.”
The court was particularly concerned with the
depiction of Stewart’s face and eyes at the time of the shooting
because it went to Stewart’s intent, which was a “hotly disputed”
156
element of the case. According to the court, the existence of the
facial expressions and movements did not merely re-create what
was in the record, but created impressions depicting “deliberate,
157
intentional actions favorable to the [s]tate’s theory of the case.”
The court held:
Because the animation’s content exceeded what was in
the record and created impressions that went right to the
heart of what the [S]tate needed to prove as to intent, and
because the animation exceeded the purpose for which it
was admitted, the158district court erred in admitting the
entire animation.

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Stewart, 643 N.W.2d at 294.
Id.
Id. at 295.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Despite the fact that the court reversed the trial court’s
admission of the entire animation, it stated that not every judicial
159
error warrants reversal.
The court stated that the medical
examiner’s testimony was accurately illustrated by the animation
160
regarding the path of the bullet. The court further believed that
there was “overwhelming evidence regarding the substantial
161
preparations to find someone to shoot.”
The court then
attempted to provide trial courts with the procedure to follow when
162
faced with computer animations.
The decision in Stewart was not meant to prohibit the use of
163
new technology such as computerized animations in court.
However, the court gave only limited help to trial courts. The court
stated that “[i]n the future, if there is proper foundation for such
evidence, the district court should issue a cautionary instruction
relating to the animation before playing the animation to the jury
164
and in final instructions to insure its proper use.” The decision
lacks a clear, definitive test for the admissibility of computerized
animation.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE STEWART DECISION
In deciding Stewart, the Minnesota Supreme Court was faced
for the first time with the challenge of analyzing when and under
what circumstances computer-generated animations are admissible
in court proceedings. Since each state adopts its own evidentiary
165
standards, admissibility standards will differ among them. The
Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Stewart is not alone in its
159. Id.; see also State v. Bradford, 618 N.W.2d 782, 794 (Minn. 2000) (holding
that “[a]n error is harmless ‘[i]f the verdict actually rendered was surely [not
attributable] to the error’”) (citing State v. Jones, 556 N.W.2d 903, 910 (Minn.
1996)).
160. Stewart, 643 N.W.2d at 295.
161. Id. The court held that “[s]uch evidence, coupled with an overwhelming
amount of corroborative and inculpatory evidence, including the testimony of
appellant himself where he admitted the shooting, indicates that the verdict
rendered was surely not attributable to the error.” Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. The court held that the evidence must fairly express or illustrate the
testimony of a witness in a way that is helpful in the jury’s understanding of the
testimony. Id.
164. Id. at 296.
165. See M UELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 33, at § 9.1 (noting that the steps
to authenticate and introduce computer-generated exhibits “vary among
jurisdictions and judges and are very much a part of local custom and professional
habit”).
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lack of direction for the lower courts. The few opinions from other
states that address the issue also have not clearly explained their
reasoning regarding the admissibility or provided specific
166
guidelines for admissibility. The common theme that emerges
from these opinions is that computer-generated evidence must be
167
relevant, authentic, and probative.
The general rule that is
166. See Richard v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 853 F.2d 1258, 1261 (5th Cir.
1988); Oregon Natural Res. Council v. Marsh, 820 F.2d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 1987);
United States v. 1,606.00 Acres of Land, 698 F.2d 402, 403-04 (10th Cir. 1983);
Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Marinelli, 628 So. 2d 378, 380 (Ala. 1993); Soule v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308 (Cal. 1994); R.B. Kent & Son, Inc. v.
Planning Comm’n of Ledyard, 573 A.2d 760, 763 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990); Murphy
v. Kentucky Utils. Co., 803 S.W.2d 582, 583-84 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991); Hopper v.
Crown, 646 So. 2d 933, 937-38 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
167. See Lori G. Baer & Christopher A. Riley, Technology in the Courtroom:
Computerized Exhibits and How to Present Them, 66 DEF. COUNS. J. 176, 182 n.31
(1999) (citing Robinson v. Mont. Pac. R.R., 16 F.3d 1083, 1087 (10th Cir. 1994)
(noting that animation was admitted where simulation of accident illustrated
expert’s theory and where trial court issued limiting instruction to jury not to
consider the video as a true recreation); Bledsoe v. Salt River Valley Water Users’
Ass’n, 880 P.2d 689, 691-93 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (holding trial court erred in
admitting videotaped computer simulation on ground that it did not “fairly and
accurately depict what it represents”); Hutchison v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 514
N.W.2d 882, 890 (Iowa 1994) (finding that video evidence was properly excluded
where it did not have sufficient factual foundation and would have confused jury);
Louisiana v. Harvey, 649 So. 2d 783, 788-89 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (affirming
admission of computer-generated animations where they illustrated expert’s
theory and noting importance that reconstructions be “identical or very similar to
the scene to have probative value”) (citing State v. Trahan, 576 So. 2d 1, 7 (La.
1990)); Pino v. Gauthier, 633 So. 2d 638, 652 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that
computer simulation videotape was properly excluded as prejudicial where it
portrayed outcomes favorable only to proponent of evidence); Commercial Union
Ins. Co. v. Boston Edison Co., 591 N.E.2d 165, 168 (Mass. 1992) (upholding the
admittance of a computer model that was admitted, in part, on accuracy of input);
Richardson v. State Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 863 S.W.2d 876, 881-82 (Mo.
1993) (affirming exclusion of computer simulation of accident because simulation
was not conducted under substantially similar conditions to those at time of
accident); Bray v. Bi-State Dev. Corp., 949 S.W.2d 93, 99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997)
(admitting computer-generated chart because it was accurate and reflected
expert’s testimony); Trageser v. St. Joseph Health Ctr., 887 S.W.2d 635, 636-37
(Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding animated videotape inadmissible where it did not
accurately represent what it purported to depict); Kudlacek v. FIAT, 509 N.W.2d
603, 617 (Neb. 1994) (affirming admission of computer video simulation, in part,
based on its conformity to actual dimensions of automobile, marks on roadway,
speed, and angle at which vehicle left roadway); State v. McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d
721, 723 (N.Y. 1984) (computer reenactment permissible if it “fairly and
accurately” reflects oral testimony and aids jury’s understanding of issue); State v.
Clark, 655 N.E.2d 795, 813 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (finding computer simulation of
crime scene was properly admitted, in part, where it was based on actual
dimensions of crime scene and relied on police calculations); Deffinbaugh v. Ohio

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss1/19

20

Godden: Cartoon Criminals: The Unclear Future of Computer Animation in th
G ODDEN-CARTOON CRIMINALS2 FORMATTED . DOC

2003]

9/15/2003 6:23 PM

COMPUTER ANIMATION IN THE COURTROOM

375

currently developing in state cases is that computer animations are
admissible if they mirror the genuine facts of a case and support
168
relevant testimony.
The Minnesota Supreme Court had several cases that it could
have used to help develop a standard. The first of these cases, Kehm
169
v. Procter & Gamble Manufacturing Co., was a decision by the
Eighth Circuit. In Kehm, the Eighth Circuit held that in order to lay
the proper foundation for admission of a demonstrative exhibit,
counsel must show “substantial similarity” between the purported
170
reenactment and the facts at issue.
In Kehm, survivors of
consumers who died of toxic shock syndrome brought a products
liability action against Procter & Gamble, a tampon
Turnpike Comm’n, 588 N.E.2d 189, 193-94 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (finding that
computer simulations were properly admitted where they accurately depicted
motion of vehicle in addition to other previously introduced facts); Sommervold v.
Grevlos, 518 N.W.2d 733, 738 (S.D. 1994) (holding that demonstrative evidence
that purports to recreate event must be “nearly identical” to event in order to
protect against undue prejudice because computer-generated recreation is
powerful visual device that stands out in jury’s mind and is likely to outweigh even
spoken testimony of eyewitnesses)). See also Gregory P. Joseph, A Simplified
Approach to Computer-Generated Evidence and Animations, 156 F.R.D. 327, 334 (1994);
Fulcher, supra note 25, at 69-70; Evelyn D. Kousoubris, Comment, Computer
Animation: Creativity in the Courtroom, 14 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 257, 258, 27071 (1995).
168. See L. Neal Ellis, Jr. et al., Recent Developments in Trial Techniques, 35 TORT
& INS. L.J. 677, 695 (2000) (stating that “[a] computer-generated animation is
admissible if it is a fair and accurate representation of the scene sought to be
depicted” (citing Cleveland v. Bryant, 512 S.E.2d 360, 362 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999));
Clark v. Cantrell, 504 S.E.2d 605, 612 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that
“[a]nimated evidence [must] mirror the actual facts of the case and relevant
testimony”). See also Hutchinson, 514 N.W.2d at 890 (upholding trial court’s refusal
to admit an animation depicting how a closed-head injury occurs because it was
not based upon the particular facts of plaintiff’s case); Sommervold, 518 N.W.2d at
738 (holding that “[a]nimation must fairly and accurately reflect the oral
testimony of the witness and be an aid to the jury in understanding the issues”)
(citing People v. McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d 721, 723 (N.Y. 1984)); James E. Carbine &
Lynn McLain, Proposed Model Rules Governing the Admissibility of Computer-Generated
Evidence, 15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 20 n.78 (1999) (citing
Bledsoe, 880 P.2d at 692) (“At a minimum, the proponent must show that the
computer simulation fairly and accurately depicts what it represents, whether
through the computer expert who prepared it or some other witness who is
qualified to so testify, and the opposing party must be afforded an opportunity for
cross-examination”). But see Galves, supra note 3, at 214 n.159 (noting Sommervold
and arguing that “courts should require the proponent of a re-creation or
simulation CGE to make only a basic showing that it is generally similar to the
conditions surrounding the original event, but not apply substantial similarity so
stringently . . . .”) (emphasis added).
169. 724 F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1983).
170. See id. at 624.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003

21

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 19
G ODDEN-CARTOON CRIMINALS2 FORMATTED . DOC

376

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

9/15/2003 6:23 PM

[Vol. 30:1

171

manufacturer.
The Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court
decision that allowed the plaintiffs to get reports of studies
172
conducted regarding the tampons admitted into evidence.
To be admissible at trial, counsel must establish that the
173
animation accurately portrays the facts at issue. Only the most
174
minimal variance may be permitted as not to be misleading. The
court in Kehm held that “admissibility of demonstration evidence
depends upon a foundational showing of substantial similarity
175
between the tests conducted and what they purport to represent.”
More importantly, the court held that “[a] trial court should use
caution in permitting such demonstrations, but the trial court’s
decision will not be overturned on appeal absent a clear showing of
176
abuse of discretion.”
The court further held that “[p]erfect
identity between experimental and actual conditions is neither
177
attainable nor required.” The only direction the court provided
in Stewart was that a trial court should make sure there is proper
foundation for the exhibit and that it should issue a cautionary
instruction relating to the animation before playing the animation
to the jury and in final instructions to ensure the animation’s
178
proper use.
The direction contains nothing regarding
“substantial similarity.”
In addition, the court also could have chosen to follow
179
Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Boston Edison Co.,
a
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision that addressed
computer-generated exhibit foundation issues and is often used as
180
a starting point for their analysis. In Boston Edison, customers sued
the utility company seeking compensation for overcharges resulting
181
from a faulty steam meter.
Although Boston Edison deals with

171. Id. at 613.
172. Id. at 617.
173. See KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 214 (John
William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
174. See id.
175. Kehm, 724 F.2d at 623.
176. Id.
177. Ramseyer v. General Motors Corp., 417 F.2d 859 (8th Cir. 1969).
“Dissimilarities affect the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.” Id.
178. Stewart, 643 N.W.2d at 295.
179. 591 N.E.2d 165 (Mass. 1992).
180. See Bledsoe, 880 P.2d at 692; Kudlacek, 509 N.W.2d at 617; State v. Clark,
655 N.E.2d 795, 812 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
181. Boston Edison, 591 N.E.2d at 166.
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182

computer simulations, it would have provided the court with
analysis it could have used to establish a feasible standard.
Clearly, trial judges need to be wary of the potential prejudicial
effects of a computer-generated exhibit. But, again, the Minnesota
Supreme Court fails to provide the lower court with any direction
on how to avoid prejudice. The only statement the court made
with regard to prejudicial effect is “[b]ecause of its dramatic power,
proposed animations must be carefully scrutinized for proper
foundation, relevancy, accuracy, and the potential for undue
183
prejudice.” Other courts have determined that in order to avoid
such possible prejudice, the admissibility of such exhibits has been
184
strictly limited by the “substantial similarity” test. This is the same
test that the court would have adopted had it followed the Eighth
Circuit decision in Kehm or the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court decision in Boston Edison.
V. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Supreme Court failed to take advantage of its
first opportunity to set out a standard for lower courts to follow
when faced with a computer-generated exhibit. Under the current
state of the law, trial judges can admit computer animations that
they believe are admissible under the Rules of Evidence but face
the possibility of reversal by the Minnesota Supreme Court based
on a standard that it has not shared with the rest of the legal
community. Perhaps the court is biding its time before providing
the lower courts with more direction—sitting back to watch how
the lower courts use new technology before the Minnesota
Supreme Court develops a standard. In the meantime, judges
faced with computer-generated exhibits should beware.

182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id.
See Campbell, supra note 55, at 1467.
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